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One very interesting aspect of the law of antitrust is that it exists
as an area of both private and public concern, and hence gives rise to
both criminal and civil causes of action.' Inherent in this dual nature
is the possibility that a deponent's civil action testimony may come
back to haunt him in a subsequent criminal proceeding in which he is
the defendant. This potential danger, quite naturally, has a significant chilling effect upon corporate employees called upon to give
depositions in private antitrust suits brought against their employers.
In this setting, it is commonplace for the deponent to assert his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination' in order to avoid

I

The federal antitrust laws contain provisions whereby an action may be brought in both a
criminal and civil context. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). The Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of civil antitrust actions in ensuring that the federal antitrust laws are obeyed. Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 329 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). The Court views the
civil antitrust action as functioning on a dual level; first, with the focus on the award of treble
damages, it functions as a deterrent against future antitrust violations: second, it acts concurrently as a means of redressing private wrongs. Id. The Court has adhered to the view that the
"'purposes of the antitrust law are best served by insuring that the private action will be an everpresent threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of antitrust laws."
Id.
2 U.S. CONST. amend V, reads in part: "'No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself ... .- The purpose behind the fifth amendment privilege is
to protect an individual from being compelled to give testimony which would subsequently be
used to prosecute him. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441 (1972). The privilege extends not only to answers that would support a criminal
conviction, but also to those answers which "would furnish a link in the chain of evidence"
necessary for prosecution. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
An individual may claim a fifth amendment privilege only if the testimony sought to be
elicited may be later used against him. Id. at 486-87. The burden on a witness who proffers a
fifth amendment claim is slight and accordingly rarely disturbed by the court. United States ex
rel. Yates v. Rundle, 326 F.2d 344, 347 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The witness who asserts his fifth
amendment privilege need only show that he has reasonable cause to believe his answers might
incriminate him. Reasonable cause is established by showing that, considering all the circumstances, the implications of the questions, and the setting in which they are asked, an answer to
the question might disclose harmful information. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486. However, for a
court to deny the fifth amendment privilege it must be "perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness who asserted the privilege is mistaken
and the answers cannot possibly have such tendency to incriminate." Id. at 488 (citing Temple v.
Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881)).
In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) the Court specifically rejected the
contention that the fifth amendment privilege was meant to apply only in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 562. The privilege against self-incrimination has routinely been applied to both
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being compelled to testify.' Hence, civil litigants damaged by pricefixing schemes are frequently deprived of testimony without which
they are unable to prevail.4
It is interesting that in prosecuting antitrust defendants, the federal government is not similarly hampered by the withholding of
testimony. This is because in many cases the Justice Department has
already obtained this testimony in an earlier criminal antitrust action
against a corporation suspected of engaging in anticompetitive behavior. 5 The government's method of procuring such information is to
circumvent the fifth amendment by granting company employees usederivative immunity.'

administrative and legislative proceedings. See Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949);
Kaminsky, Preventing Unjair Use of the Privilege Against SelfI-ncrimination in Private Civil
Litigation: A CriticalAnalysis, 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 121 (1972).
Although claims of fifth amendment privilege are routinely upheld by civil trial courts, in
criminal proceedings such claims are thwarted by grants of immunity as provided for in 18
U.S.C. § 6002 (1982). See infra note 6 for text of statute.
See infra notes 42-72 and accompanying text.
Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72, 81 (3d Cir. 1977). The
successful plaintiff must show that the defendants contracted, combined, or conspired to violate
the antitrust laws by restraint of trade. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Plaintiff must demonstrate
public injury, that is "'that the combination or conspiracy produced adverse anticompetitive
effects within a relevant product and geographic market."
See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1982) (§ 1 requires plaintiff to show
that defendant has contracted, combined, or conspired to violate antitrust laws by restraint of
trade). In order to recover, the civil litigant must put forth evidence from which the jury can
infer that a violation of the antitrust laws occurred, resulting in public injury as well as specific
injury to the plaintiff. Glauser Dodge, 570 F.2d at 81. A litigant is required to demonstrate
direct and proximate injury to his business or property as a result of such conspiracy. See Ansul
Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (Ansul's treble damage suit
dismissed due to failure to prove any damage suffered was related to Uniroyal's anticompetitive
behavior), aff'd, 448 F.2d 872, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1971).
Nevertheless, a civil antitrust plaintiff is not held to the same burden of proof as the
government must establish in its criminal case. The civil litigant's burden of proof is "substantially less than 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard borne by the government in its criminal
action." In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 410 F. Supp.
659, 666 (D. Minn. 1974).
5 See Steinhouse, A PracticalApproach to Representation of a Client During a Federal
Antitrust GrandJury Investigation, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 97 (1980) (government will often grant
immunity to obtain testimony needed to indict corporation allegedly engaged in anticompetitive
behavior). The government need not be concerned with a corporate defendant refusing to supply
needed information based upon a threat of incrimination inasmuch as corporations do not possess
a fifth amendment right. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384 (1911).
6 Use-derivative immunity, which is narrower than transactional immunity, prohibits the
government from directly or indirectly using any information elicited from an individual testifying under a grant of immunity; it does not foreclose the possibility of an immunized witness
being prosecuted, but rather permits prosecution only if the government can show that the
evidence it proposes to use is free of "taint" from the prior immunized testimony, and thus
constitutes a wholly new, independent source. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453
(1972).
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The roadblock to civil antitrust litigants created by the corporate
employee's refusal to testify at a deposition hearing was at issue in the
recent case of Pillsburyv. Conboy. 7 In January of 1978, John Conboy,
an executive of Weyerhaeuser Company, 8 was subpoenaed to testify
before a federal grand jury investigating price-fixing activities in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 9 Conboy, a participant in the
alleged illegal activities, asserted his fifth amendment privilege. ' 0 Subsequently, he was granted use-derivative immunity" for his testimony
12
and appeared before the grand jury.
Conboy was again subpoenaed to appear in May of 1981 for
depositions to support a civil suit brought by the Pillsbury Corporation against Weyerhaeuser for the same price-fixing activities. 13 At the

18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982) which defines use-derivative immunity provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee or
subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order
issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order.
Id. (emphasis added).
Transactional immunity is to be distinguished in that it extends not only to any crime about
which a witness may testify but also to "any transaction, matter or thing." Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591, 608 (1896) (emphasis in original). Thus, if in the course of his testimony a witness
mentioned additional illegalities in which he participated, the government was precluded from
prosecuting him even though the other illegal acts testified about had no connection to his
immunized testimony.
Mere use immunity, on the other hand, is narrower than either transactional or usederivative immunity since it only prevents direct use of the immunized testimony. Ullman v.
United States, 350 U.S. 442, 437 (1956). Section 6002 has precluded the use of either transactional or use immunity.
7 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983).
Brief for Petitioner at 3, Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 103 S.Ct. 608 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Brief for Petitioner].
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
'oPillsbury, 103 S.Ct. at 610.
" See supra note 6 for text of 18 U.S.C. § 6002 providing for use-derivative immunity.
12 Pillsbury, 103 S.Ct. at 610.
"1 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8. Subsequent to several criminal indictments being
handed down in the government's antitrust action, a myriad of civil antitrust actions were
initiated. Pillsbury, 103 S. Ct. at 610. For purposes of discovery all the civil actions were
consolidated in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Id. at 610-11. Pillsbury
opted out of the class action and brought its own cause of action. Id. at 611.
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deposition, Conboy, his counsel, and Pillsbury's counsel all had copies
of the immunized grand jury testimony. 14 Pillsbury's counsel drew his
deposition questions from the transcript, incorporated Conboy's prior
answers into the questions, and asked him if that was the information
to which he had testified. 15 Following each question, Conboy asserted
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused
to answer.' 6 Pillsbury then moved to compel Conboy to answer and
the district court granted the motion 7 but Conboy continued in his
refusal to answer and was held in contempt. The order was stayed
pending appeal.'

8

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court
order.19 On rehearing the issue en banc, however, the Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court, finding that Conboy was entitled to assert
his fifth amendment privilege. 20 The appeals court found that section
6002 of the Organized Crime Control Act 2' (O.C.C.A.) does not

protect a deponent's civil deposition testimony that either repeats
exactly or closely follows his prior immunized testimony. 22 The United
States Supreme Court, recognizing a split in the circuits, 23 granted
certiorari and affirmed the Seventh Circuit, holding that Conboy
could not be compelled to testify over his valid fifth amendment
assertion 24

11 Pursuant to an order of the district court, the immunized testimony was made available to
the attorneys for the class action and the opt-outs. Id.
15 The Court provided an example of the questioning: -Q. Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board? Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with
Fred Renshaw and Dick Herman . . .?
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, i978?" Id. at 611 n.2.
16 Id. at 611.
17 Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (b) (1976) conferred power upon Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr.
of the District Court for the Southern District of Texas to grant the motion. Id. at 611 n.3.
, Id. at 611.
19 In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., Appeal of Conboy, 655 F.2d 748, 754, rev'd
on rehearing, 661 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1981), af'd sub nom. Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 103 S. Ct.
608 (1983).
o 661 F.2d 1145, 1159 (7th Cir. 1981).
21 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1982).
22 In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., Appeal of Conboy, 661 F.2d 1145, 1159 (7th
Cir. 1981), a f'd sub nom. Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983).
23 The question of whether immunity extended to civil deposition questions based on immunized testimony had been resolved differently by the circuits. Compare In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1981) (deposition
answers immunized) and Appeal of Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1979) (same) with In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., Appeal of Franey, 620 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1980) (deposition answers not immunized); see also infra notes 42-72 and accompanying text.
24 Pillsbury, 103 S. Ct. at 617-18.
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Historically, statutory immunity has been utilized to supplant a
witness' fifth amendment right to remain silent in order to compel
him to speak where the government has great need for information. 25
Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that a grant of immunity must be consistent with the protection
afforded an individual under the fifth amendment. 26 Nevertheless,
despite the Court's holdings that an immunity grant is coexistent with
the fifth amendment protection, Congress has contracted and expanded the scope of this protection since the passage of the first
federal immunity statute in 1857.27
In 1970, Congress intended to put an end to the "immunity
baths" it perceived to flow from transactional immunity which protected a witness from prosecution for any criminal act about which he
testified, even if independent evidence existed, or if the criminal act(s)
mentioned in his testimony were not being investigated at the time of
the immunity grant. 28 The result was the enactment of Title II of
O.C.C.A.,'2 9 which supplanted transactional immunity with use-derivative immunity, thus exposing a witness to prosecution if evidence
wholly independent of the compelled testimony was discovered.

21

See Comment, Current Controversies Concerning Witness Immunity in the Federal

Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 123 (1981-82); see also Kaminsky, supra note 2, at 124-28.
Mykkeltvedt, To Supplant the Fifth Amendment's Right against Self-Incrimination: the Supreme Court and Federal Grants of Witness Immunity, 30 MRacFa L. REV. 633 (1979).
11 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1971); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 54 (1964); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 594 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892).
21 The first federal immunity statute provided broad transactional immunity. Act of Jan. 24,
1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 155. The Act of 1857 was rescinded in 1868 and replaced with a statute
providing mere use immunity. Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, § 1, 15 Stat. 37. In 1893 a new
immunity statute was enacted, The Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443
(repealed 1970). This Act afforded a witness transactional immunity for his compelled testimony. This grant of broad immunity was reduced by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1982) to use-derivative immunity. See supra note 6 for a comparison of
the three types of statutory immunity.
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) presented the only instance in which the
Court struck down an immunity statute for constitutional inadequacy. The statute challenged in
Counselman provided a witness with mere use immunity for his testimony; it did not prevent the
government from using his compelled testimony to search out other sources of evidence for
subsequent use against him. Id. at 564. The Court maintained that unless an immunity statute
afforded a witness absolute immunity from prosecution for the crime about which he is compelled to testify, the protection afforded is not equal to the protection of the fifth amendment
and therefore cannot be used to supplant the fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 585-86.
See supra note 6.
18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1982). See supra note 6 for text of § 6002 which provides for usederivative immunity.
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In Kastigar v. United States,3 0 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of use-derivative immunity.3 ' The Kastigar Court, acknowledging that a grant of immunity must provide
protection equal to that of the fifth amendment, 32 found transactional
immunity to go beyond that in affording greater protection than was
constitutionally mandated. 33 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 34 found that the privilege against self-incrimination does not guarantee that one who invokes it is removed from the threat of any
subsequent prosecution. 3 5 The Justice pointed out that transactional
immunity supersedes these bounds by guaranteeing the witness absolute immunity against future prosecution.3 6 Noting that the primary
concern of the privilege against self-incrimination is to prevent one
from being compelled to give testimony leading to punishment for
criminal acts, 3 7 the Court reasoned that since use-derivative immunity
prohibits any use of compelled testimony which further prosecutes the
witness, the protection afforded is equivalent to the fifth amendment
38
and thus is constitutionally permissible.
The KastigarCourt also emphasized that once a witness testifies
under a grant of use-derivative immunity, the government bears a
heavy burden to prove that any evidence it proposes to use in a
subsequent prosecution is derived from a source wholly independent
of the compelled testimony. 39 The Court viewed this burden as a "very
substantial protection, commensurate with that resulting from invoking the privilege itself. 40 Although the constitutional adequacy of usederivative immunity as provided for in section 6002 has not been

- 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
Id. at 462. The petitioners in Kastigarwere subpoenaed to appear before a United States
grand jury. Id. at 442. Since it was probable that the petitioners would assert their right to
silence, the government moved for an order granting immunity to the petitioners pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003. Id. Despite the petitioners' contention that the scope of use-derivative
immunity was not coterminous with the fifth amendment, the district court granted the order.
Id. The petitioners persisted in their refusal to testify and were held in contempt. Id. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court order, id. at 442-43, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Id. at 453.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Justice Powell was joined in the majority opinion by Justices Burger, Stewart, White, and
Blackmun. Justices Douglas and Marshall each dissented separately.
35 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
31

36 Id.
37 Id.
31

at 452.
Id. at 462.

39 Id.
40

at 460.

Id. at 461.
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challenged since Kastigar, the question remained whether a grant of
immunity reached deposition questions based on immunized testi4
mony, thus precluding a fifth amendment claim. '
In 1979 in Appeal of Starkey, 42 the Eighth Circuit answered this
question positively. Starkey, a dairy employee, was granted immunity
when subpoenaed to testify in 1977 at a federal grand jury criminal
investigation of price-fixing in the Arkansas milk industry. 43 The criminal proceedings were terminated in December of 1977 after all the
defendants pleaded nolo contendere;44 however, prior to such termination, the state of Arkansas brought a civil class action against the
dairies. 45 During the subsequent period of discovery, the trial court
ordered Starkey's grand jury testimony released, 46 and he was thereafter subpoenaed to answer deposition questions formulated largely
upon the basis of his protected statements. 47 His assertions of the fifth
amendment privilege gave rise to a contempt order from which he
48
appealed.
The Eighth Circuit concluded that Starkey could not use the fifth
amendment in refusing to answer questions as his replies would be
"tainted" by the federal grand jury testimony and therefore could not
subject him to future prosecution. 49 Judge McMillan, writing for a
unanimous court, noted two factors which were indicative of "taint":
(1) the grand jury testimony had been made available to all the parties
and utilized by Arkansas' counsel in questioning Starkey at the civil
deposition; and (2) the sequence of the deposition questions closely
followed the order of the grand jury testimony, many of the questions
being simply the immunized testimony repeated verbatim. 50 Further,
the court found the fact that the Deputy Attorney General of Arkansas
had argued that the deposition questions were derived from the immunized transcript particularly persuasive in showing that Starkey's

11See infra notes 42-72 and accompanying

text.

42 600 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1979).
41 Id. at 1045.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.

Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1045. Starkey was sentenced to an unspecified period of imprisonment to last until
he testified at the civil deposition. The sentence was suspended pending appeal. Id. at 1045 n.2.
41 Id. at 1046. The court found Starkey's deposition replies tainted despite the fact that the
federal prosecutor refused to grant separate immunity for this deposition testimony. The request
was refused because the government was not a party to the civil antitrust action. Such a request
was never made to the state prosecutor. Id.
41

48

50Id.
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statements were tainted . 5 The combination of these factors led the
court to conclude that so long as the deposition testimony was confined to the limits of the grand jury transcript, it would be "tainted"
and thus, the deponent could be compelled to speak. 52 In order to
limit the deposition testimony to the parameters of the grand jury
testimony, the court instructed that Starkey be required to answer
those "questions which [were] within the same time, geographical and
5 3
substantive framework as the grand jury testimony.
The Second Circuit followed the Starkey rationale in the factually similar In re CorrugatedContainerAntitrust Litigation, Appeal
of Fleischacker.5 4 Fleischacker, granted immunity for his testimony
before a federal grand jury investigating price-fixing activities in the
corrugated container industry, was subsequently subpoenaed to testify
at civil depositions stemming from the criminal action.55 As in
Starkey, the federal grand jury testimony had been released and the
deposition questions were based upon them.56 In response to each
deposition question Fleischacker asserted his fifth amendment right
5 7
and was subsequently held in contempt.
Judge Meskill, writing the Fleischacker decision,58 relied on the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning in concluding that the corporate executive
could be compelled to speak if the questions posed were derived from
prior immunized testimony.59 The Second Circuit reasoned that, as
the answers to such questions would be derived from the immunized
testimony, they would be "tainted" and therefore precluded from use
in a subsequent criminal action.80 The Fleischackercourt, recognizing
the potential danger resulting from the interference of the civil deposition answers with subsequent criminal prosecutions, concluded that a
witness should not be required to "respond to questions that do not

51 id.
52 Id.
13 Id. at 1048. In 1980 the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Little Rock School Dist. v.
Borden, Inc., 632 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1980). Factually, Little Rock School Dist. was similar to
Starkey except that in Little Rock School Dist. the grand jury testimony was not released. Id. at
705. As in Starkey, the court held that so long as the deposition questions were confined to the
"'same time, geographical and substantive framework as the witness' immunized grand jury
testimony' " the witness could be compelled to answer. Id. (quoting Appeal of Starkey, 600 F.2d
at 1048 (8th Cir. 1979)).
644 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1981).
55 Id. at 72-73.
16 Id. at 73.

57

Id.

58Id. at

77.

19 Id. at 75.
60 Id.
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concern subjects actually touched upon by questions appearing in the
6
transcript of the prior immunized testimony." '

In In re Corrugated ContainerAnti-Trust Litigation, Appeal of
Franey,6 2 the Fifth Circuit created a split in the circuitse 3 by holding
that a witness could not be compelled to answer civil deposition
questions based on prior immunized testimony absent a separate grant
of immunity.6 4 The Franey court maintained that it was not the role
of the district court to determine if the answers to civil deposition
questions would be tainted by the prior immunized testimony.6 5 Judge
Tjoflat explained that the only inquiry the court should make is
whether the witness may properly invoke his fifth amendment privilege in response to the deposition questions.66 The Franey court posited a two-part inquiry to make this determination: first, whether the
witness' answers might reveal his involvement in criminal activities,
and second, whether the witness would face the risk6 7 of prosecution
for criminal activities that might be revealed by his testimony. 8 Judge
Tjoflat concluded that if the answers to both of these inquiries were
affirmative, the witness could then assert his fifth amendment privilege and refuse to answer.69
Applying this analysis to the situation presented in Appeal of
Franey, 70 Judge Tjoflat concluded that the deponent's answers might
reveal his involvement in criminal antitrust violations on both a state
and federal level. 7' Additionally, as the applicable statute of limitations had not yet run, and a new criminal investigation into the

61 Id.
62 620 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1980). The appeals of Charles J. Franey, Philip Fleischacker, and
Alex Hopkins were consolidated into one appeal. The Fifth Circuit litigated the appeals of
Franey and Hopkins. Fleischacker's appeal was litigated in the Second Circuit. See supra notes
54-61 and accompanying text.
63 See supra notes at 42-72 and accompanying text.
" Appeal of Franey, 620 F.2d at 1095.
61 Id. at 1093. The Second and Eighth Circuits did not examine the power of the court to
determine whether a witness may assert his fifth amendment privilege. These courts, in upholding the lower court decisions to compel testimony, maintained that the district courts were not
creating immunity by ordering testimony, but were only identifying a derived use of already
immunized testimony. See Appeal of Fleischacker,644 F.2d at 78; Appeal of Starkey, 600 F.2d
at 1047-48.
Appeal of Franey, 620 F.2d at 1093.
"' The risk may even be a remote risk. Id.; see In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 609
F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979).
Appeal of Franey, 620 F.2d at 1093.
69

Id.

Id.
I0 at 1093-95.
71 Id. at 1092.
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corrugated container industry had begun, the court perceived the
possibility of future prosecution and therefore determined that Franey
72
could properly remain silent.
In Pillsbury, although the parties' central arguments concerned
whether Conboy's answers to deposition questions based on immunized testimony would be derived from such testimony pursuant to
section 6002, 73 the United State Supreme Court maintained that the
real issue involved in the dispute was whether the grant of immunity
given to Conboy for his grand jury testimony carried over to the
subsequent civil deposition, thereby compelling him to speak. 7 4 Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, 75 pointed out that if Pillsbury's claim
that the grant of immunity extended to the civil depositions was
rejected, Conboy could not be compelled to speak and an analysis into
whether his answers, if freely given, would have been derived from
76
the prior testimony would be meaningless.
Focusing on Congress' purpose in enacting O.C.C.A., the majority concluded that section 6002 was intended to aid the government in
its law enforcement efforts. 77 By limiting the scope of immunity to
use-derivative and by vesting the authority to grant immunity solely
within the Justice Department,78 the Court reasoned that Congress
sought to meet dual government needs: obtaining the information

Id.
Pillsbury and Conboy differed as to whether there was a distinction between questions
being derived and answers being derived. Pillsbury, 103 S. Ct. at 613-14. It was Pillsbury's
contention that since the deposition questions were derived from the immunized testimony, the
answers which would closely track the prior testimony of the witness would also be derived from
the protected testimony and incapable of subsequent use against the deponent. Id. at 613.
Conboy, on the other hand, claimed the answers to questions derived from immunized testimony
were not in themselves necessarily derived. Id. Conboy contended that each answer arose from a
deponent's current memory and, as such, constituted a new "source" capable of subsequent use
against the witness. Id. at 613-14.
11 Id. at 614.
75 The Pillsbury appeal resulted in a 7-2 decision. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Brennan
separately concurred in the decision of the Court although Justice Brennan chose not to write an
opinion since his differences with the Court were not substantive. Justice Stevens was joined in a
dissent by Justice O'Connor.
76 Pillsbury, 103 S. Ct. at 614. Inasmuch as the Court did reject Pillsbury's claim, the
majority did not address whether Conboy's answers would have been so derived. Id.
11 Id. at 616. The Crime Control Act of 1970, of which § 6002 was an integral part, was
drafted by the Nixon Administration as part of its campaign promise to "restore law and order."
See Mykkeltvedt, supra note 25.
78 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982) provides that in cases where an individual refuses to testify at a
proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States,
a United States Attorney may request a grant of immunity for such individual if in his judgment
the testimony is necessary to the public interest.
72
13
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necessary for a criminal investigation while at the same time protecting its interest in further prosecution. 9
Perceiving the deponent's interest as being adequate protection
from prosecution, Justice Powell acknowledged that this concern
would be maintained either through an extension of immunity or the
right to silence.80 Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that the government's interest would be adversely affected by the carryover of immunity from grand jury testimony to deposition answers.8 The majority
found that this expanded immunity might result in .the deponent
making additional statements that he did not make before the grand
82
jury, thus possibly jeopardizing future government prosecutions.
Although the Court admitted the possibility that the deposition direct
questions could so closely track the immunized testimony that no new
information would be elicited, it acknowledged that cross-examina83
tion of the deponent would produce new immunized evidence.
Thus, the Pillsbury majority viewed Pillsbury's interpretation of section 6002 as extending to civil depositions to infringe upon the governturning use-derivative
ment's law enforcement interest by essentially
4
immunity into transactional immunity.
Further, the Pillsbury Court maintained that Pillsbury's position
places substantial risks on the deponent. 8 5 Preliminarily, the Court

71 Pillsbury, 103 S. Ct. at 616. Inasmuch as Kastigar imposed a heavy burden on the
prosecutor when a witness had been granted immunity, it appears that Justice Powell was
referring to prosecution for collateral matters rather than prosecution for the subject matter of
the testimony when he spoke of the government's prosecutorial interest. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at
468.
8o Pillsbury, 103 S. Ct. at 614. Although the Court contended that a deponent's interest
would be maintained either through the extension of immunity or a fifth amendment assertion,
Justice Powell noted that there may be practical reasons, such as the increased risk of perjury, for
a witness preferring to remain silent. Id. at 614 & n.14.
81 Id. at 614.
82 Id. at 615. The majority pointed out that this expansion of immunity could severely hinder
the government in an ongoing investigation. Id. at 616. Justice Powell reasoned that immunizing
the witness' deposition answers would make it more difficult for the government to meet the
burden imposed by Kastigar to show that the information proposed to be used was derived from
a source wholly independent of the compelled testimony. Id.
13 The majority maintained that direct examination might not be as limited as Pillsbury
assumed it could be. Id. at 615 n. 16. The Court noted that courts of appeals had allowed direct
questioning in similar circumstances to go beyond a mere repetition of prior testimony. Id.; see
Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F.2d at 79 (witness compelled to respond to questions "concerning
specific subjects that actually were touched upon by the questions appearing in the transcript of
the immunized testimony"); Appeal of Starkey, 600 F.2d at 1048 (witness compelled "to answer
only questions which are within the same time, geographical and substantive framework as the
grand jury testimony").
84 Pillsbury, 103 S. Ct. at 614.
11 Id. at 616.
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noted that a district court does not have the power under section 6003
to extend immunity; 8 thus, any broadening of immunity by a district
court would amount to little more than a conjecture that in a subsequent trial the government would not be able to show a wholly
independent source for the testimony. 87 Additionally, the majority
pointed out that by compelling deposition testimony, a court would
be subjecting the witness to other risks.8 8 Justice Powell concluded
that if forced to testify, a witness would not receive his.fifth amendment protection. 89
Although the Court recognized Pillsbury's need for information,
it nonetheless noted that such need could only be maintained if it did
not encroach on either the government's or the deponent's interest.90
The majority maintained that civil antitrust actions, despite their
importance as a means of strengthening the criminal laws, were to
supplement, not to supplant the government's interest. 9' Accordingly,
the Court held that absent a grant of immunity a witness could not be
compelled to answer deposition questions based on prior immunized
92
testimony.
Justice Marshall concurred with the majority that Conboy could
remain silent, yet also concluded that any answers the deponent may
93
have given would have been derived from the immunized testimony.
Although the Justice found that these tainted answers could not be
used in a subsequent trial, he posited that the deponent still ran
certain risks by testifying. 4 The concurrence reasoned that a witness
forced to give incriminating evidence at a deposition may be subsequently compelled to undergo more civil depositions based on his civil
testimony and possibly have his statements elaborated on, thus creating the risk that such tainted evidence will not be able to be traced
back to its original source. 9 5

88 See supra note 78.
87 Pillsbury, 103 S. Ct. at 616.
a8Id. at 616-17; see infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
89 Id. at 616.
10 Id. at 614.
1! Id. at 617.
92 Id. at 617-18.
93 Id. at 618. Justice Marshall was able to conclude that the answers would have been
derived from the grand jury testimony because the questions were based on the testimony and
there was no indication that the same questions would have been asked absent the grand jury
transcript. Id.
11Id. at 620.
95 Id.
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Justice Blackmun also concurred with the majority's holding 6
that Conboy could remain silent, but he contended that Conboy's
answers would not have been derived from the immunized testimony. 97 The Justice perceived the numerous references in the legislative history of section 6002 to the "fruits" doctrine enunciated in
Wong Sun v. United States"" as indicative of Congress' intent to
construe the phrase "directly or indirectly derived from" in terms of
the "fruits" doctrine. 99 Accordingly, Justice Blackmun maintained
that if the deponent answered the questions of his own volition without being influenced by the compulsion of his prior testimony, the
responses would be the result of " 'an intervening act of free will' ,,100
and would not be derived from the privileged testimony.' 0' The Justice reasoned that because Conboy's assertion of his fifth amendment
privilege, 102 the considerable lapse of time between the giving of the
immunized testimony and the civil depositions indicated a voluntary
choice to respond not influenced by the prior compulsion, his answers
would be the act of an "intervening independent act of free will" and
03
could subsequently be used against him. 1
In a strong dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Marshall
that the deposition answers would have been "directly or indirectly
derived from" the prior immunized testimony yet contended that the
deponent could be compelled to testify without fear of subsequent
prosecution. 104 Justice Stevens criticized the majority's analysis, which

96 Id. at 622.

17Id. at 626.
-- 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The "fruits" doctrine as explained by the Court in Wong Sun is,
conceding the existence of a primary illegality (i.e., an illegal arrest), any evidence obtained by
an exploitation of that illegality must be excluded from future use as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Id. at 484. However, once there is an intervening act of free will and the connection between the
primary illegality becomes so attenuated as to be purged of the taint, then the evidence need not
be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. Id.
9 Pillsbury, 103 S. Ct. at 624.
100 Id. at 625 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486).
101Id. at 626.
102 Although Justice Blackmun noted that when any witness previously granted immunity
asserts his fifth amendment privilege at a subsequent civil deposition he engages in an independent act of free will, he pointed out that it did not necessarily follow that one who does not assert
his fifth amendment privilege in the same situation should have his testimony become automatically admissible against him. Id. at 627. Justice Blackmun maintained that if such testimony was
subsequently introduced, it was the role of the Court to determine, in light of all the circumstances, whether the statements were "derived from" the protected testimony. Id.
103 Id. at 626.
04 Id. at 627 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The heavy burden imposed upon the prosecutor by
Kastigar greatly reduces the possibility of future prosecution. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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found the government to retain an interest in 'prosecuting the witness
after granting him immunity under section 6002. Justice Stevens
maintained that the government's primary interest was, rather, the
unearthing of the maximum amount of information to prosecute the
witness' confederates. 105 Thus, the Justice concluded that only a broad
induce the witness to meet the
construction of section 6002 would
06
need.
foremost
government's
Focusing upon the damage to law enforcement that would result
from the majority's holding, Justice Stevens perceived a substantial
public interest in having injured private parties inquire into the details
of antitrust arrangements through depositions.107 Further, the dissent
stressed that even if one could find a hypothetical risk that expanded
immunity could hinder a possible prosecution,'0 ° the enforcement
interest in allowing the deposition to occur clearly outweighed the
chance of such a hindrance.' 0 9 In particular, Justice Stevens posited
that the factual situation in Pillsbury did not jeopardize the government's prosecutorial interest inasmuch as no information beyond the
grand jury transcript was sought at the deposition. 0
Although the Pillsbury decision has settled the question of
whether the immunity given a witness for his grand jury testimony
carries over to subsequent civil depositions, the Court's holding will
create serious problems for civil antitrust litigants who are forced to
rely upon previously immunized witnesses for information. By eliminating use-derivative immunity as a means of discovery for the plaintiff injured by a price-fixing scheme, the United States Supreme Court
has closed off the litigants' major avenue to obtain evidence."'
Private antitrust actions have long been recognized by the courts
as an important mechanism by which to enforce criminal antitrust
laws: 1 2 The private action has been viewed as a deterrent to future

105Id. at 630-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 631 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 632 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 633 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

109 Id.
ll0

"

Id.

Generally, the information the civil antitrust litigant requires is confined to the memories
of several corporate employees who in most cases have been granted immunity for their testimony in the criminal antitrust case. See Steinhouse, supra note 5. As a result of the Court's
holding, these employees may assert their fifth amendment privilege and thus preclude the civil
litigant from obtaining information which in most likelihood is not available from other sources.
See also Sullivan, Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the Private Treble Damage Antitrust
Action, 14 SOroN HALL L. REv. 17, 21 n.25 (1983)(decline in number of private antitrust actions
may be consequence of Court decisions having detrimental impact on civil antitrust plaintiffs).
112See supra note 1.
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violations of these laws. 1 3 In light of the importance placed upon
these civil actions, it becomes even more apparent that the civil antitrust plaintiff needs alternative ways to obtain admissible evidence
when faced with a previously immunized witness who now asserts his
fifth amendment privilege.
Three methods to facilitate discovery for the civil antitrust litigant in light of the Pillsbury decision have been posited by Janet L.
McDavid. l l4 The first approach is for the courts to permit antitrust
plaintiffs to utilize at trial the grand jury testimony of the deponent
who asserts his fifth amendment privilege." 5 Despite the fact that
such evidence would be hearsay, McDavid foresaw the likelihood of
admissibility under the residual hearsay exception in the Federal Rules
of Evidence. "

6

Secondly, McDavid has proposed that juries be permitted to
draw an adverse inference against the defendant corporation whose
13

Id.

"I MeDavid, Decision Will Have Major Impact On Depositionsin Civil Litigation, Nat'l L.
J., Mar. 14, 1983, at 26.
115 Id.
11

Id.

(citing FED. R. EvID. 804). This rule, in pertinent part, provides:

Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable.
(a) Definition of unavailability. -"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(b)...
(5) Other exceptions.- A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable effort;
and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
FED. R. Evln. 804.
This position was also taken by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954
(6th Cir. 1982). Barlow involved a witness who gave adverse testimony to the defendant at a
grand jury proceeding. Subsequently, the witness married the defendant and asserted her spousal
privilege so as not to be forced to testify against her husband at trial. Id. at 957. The Sixth Circuit
concluded that by exercising her privilege she was unavailable within the meaning of the rule.
Id. at 961. Second, the court examined the grand jury testimony and determined that it
substantively possessed circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the other
exceptions in Rule 804. Id. at 962. In concluding that the guarantees were equivalent, the court
focused on the fact that the witness had been immunized and thus lacked an exculpatory motive,
she had personal knowledge of the events testified about and there was corroborating evidence.
Id.
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employee refuses to speak,11 7 a technique that was utilized in Corrugated Container,Antitrust Litigation'18 The author also noted that in
other circumstances the courts have held that an adverse inference
may be drawn from a claim of fifth amendment privilege."19
Finally, McDavid has suggested that the antitrust plaintiff utilize
federal law' 20 which permits the use of a conviction procured by the
government in a prior criminal or civil antitrust action as prima facie
evidence in a later civil action of the same matter.' 2' McDavid has
pointed out, however, that the statute is not applicable in instances of
22
nolo contendere pleas or consent judgments.1
These proposals, though well-intentioned, have several underlying flaws which render them inadequate in meeting the evidentiary
needs of the civil antitrust litigant. First, a necessary prerequisite to
having grand jury transcripts admitted into evidence is gaining access
to such testimony.123 A request undoubtedly would have to be made
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provide that
grand jury testimony may be disclosed when a court directs it be
released prior to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.' 24 This
rule was interpreted by the Court in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops
Northwest 125 to require the one seeking the testimony to show "a
McDavid, supra note 114, at 27.
l Id. at 27 & n.18. In citing to this case, McDavid explained that the court informed the jury
that they could decide what import should be given to the fifth amendment claim but they were
precluded from basing their verdict solely on the witness' silence.
"I Id. at 27 & n.19 (citing Baxter v. Palmingiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (adverse inference
permitted at prison disciplinary proceeding)).
120 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982) provides:
(a) A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust
laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie
evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other
party against such defendant under said laws as to all matter respecting which said
judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided,
That this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any
testimony has been taken. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to
impose any limitation on the application of collateral estoppel, except that, in any
action or proceeding brought under the antitrust laws, collateral estoppel effect shall
not be given to any finding made by the Federal Trade Commission under the
antitrust laws or under section 45 of this title which could give rise to a claim for
relief under the antitrust laws.
12 See supra note 120; McDavid, supra note 114, at 27.
122 McDavid, supra note 114, at 27.
123 See generally Comment, Grand Jury Disclosure in Antitrust Litigation, 32 CATH. U.L.
REv. 437 (1983).
124 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(c)(i).
5 441 U.S. 211 (1979). Douglas Oil was the first case in which the Supreme Court decided
the accessibility of grand jury transcripts to civil antitrust plaintiffs. Previously the Court had
"1
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particularized need" by satisfying a three-prong test.126 First, the one
seeking such testimony must show that the testimony being sought is
necessary to avoid possible injustice in a subsequent judicial proceeding; second, he must show that the need for disclosure outweighs the
need for preserving secrecy; and finally, that the request is limited to
cover only necessary material. 127 Although the Court maintained that
the individual seeking the grand jury transcript bears a lighter burden
justifying the release where the testimony has been disclosed, 12 the
requirement that the plaintiff meet the three-prong Douglas Oil test
may, in many circumstances, result in the inability to obtain the
transcript. Further, even if the plaintiff is able to obtain the grand
jury transcript, there remains the question of admissibility at trial.129
Accordingly, this often would be an inadequate remedy.
McDavid's suggestion that the court permit the jury to draw an
adverse inference against the defendant requires further explanation.
It is generally accepted that a claim of fifth amendment privilege may
not be the basis for such an inference. 130 An adverse inference may be

only addressed the issue of requests for grand jury transcripts by antitrust defendants. See Dennis
v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677
(1958).
121 Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222.
127

Id.

Id. at 223.
'29 As noted by McDavid, supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text, the grand jury testimony would be hearsay by virtue of FED. R. EvID. 801 which in pertinent part provides:
Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement.- A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant.- A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay.- "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
Id.
The majority in Pillsbury assumed that the grand jury transcripts would be inadmissible at
trial because the testimony was not subject to cross-examination. Pillsbury, 103 S. Ct. at 615
n.17.
130 See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995
(1971). The evidentiary value of fifth amendment claims has been mainly considered in the
criminal context, but the analysis is equally applicable to antitrust cases. See Hartwell &
Kenyon, Reconciling fifth amendment claims and the Jactfinding process in civil antitrust
litigation, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 633 (1981).
To allow a jury to base an inference on a fifth amendment claim would give rise to questions
of relevancy. See FED. R. EVID. 401. A witness may have other reasons than guilt for asserting his
privilege. See supra note 80. Further, even if it was determined that the fifth amendment claim
was relevant, the prejudicial effect may substantially outweigh the probative value. See FED. R.
EvID. 403.
128
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drawn, however, from a witness' silence, even if his silence is a result
of a fifth amendment claim. 13 1 Accordingly, it is the witness' silence
which is being commented upon rather than the exercise of his consti32
tutional privilege.
Inasmuch as the adverse inference is a sanction against the defendant, it may not be very useful in the civil antitrust context where
33
it is not the corporate defendant refusing to speak, but an employee.
In order to allow an adverse inference to be drawn against the corporate defendant, the individual asserting the privilege must be under
the control of the corporation. 34 In each instance the court would be
required to make this determination,1 35 which the judiciary has been
reluctant to do. 136 Thus, the cumbersome and unpredictable nature of
this process suggests that the adverse inference may not be a very
effective aid to antitrust plaintiffs.
The assistance that 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) will afford civil antitrust
litigants is also minimal. Although the statute provides that a final
judgment or decree adjudging a defendant to have violated the antitrust laws is available as prima facie evidence against such defendant
in a subsequent civil antitrust action, consent judgments and nolo
contendere pleas, 137 both common to criminal antitrust actions, are
not permitted as evidence.138 This fatal flaw renders the statute inadequate to most civil antitrust plaintiffs.

"I1
See Baxter v. Palmingiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (inference may be drawn from party's
silence even when silence results from fifth amendment claim).
132 See generally Hartwell & Kenyon, supra note 130.
133 Corporations do not possess a fifth amendment privilege. Hale v. Henkle, 201 U.S. 43
(1906); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
"I See B.F. Goodrich Tire Co. v. E.H. Lyster, 328 F.2d 411 (1964) (sanctions could not be
imposed upon defendant for refusal of employee not under his control to testify).
"I See id.
136 It has been posited that in antitrust cases a corporate defendant's ability to exercise
control
over its employees' fifth amendment claims ranges from very limited when dealing with current
employees to nonexistent when the individuals are no longer employees. See Hartwell & Kenyon,
supra note 130, at 664. Accordingly, it may be assumed that in most civil antitrust actions
adverse inferences will not be allowed.
'I" See supra note 120 for text of statute.
38 Consent pleas enable the government to settle antitrust litigation
without having to go
through a long, drawn out period of litigation. Consent judgments are integral to the enforcement of the antitrust laws. United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D.
Pa. 1970). In order to encourage defendants to capitulate early in the stages of the antitrust
action so as to avoid the costs of litigation, Congress exempted consent judgments and nolo
contendere pleas from the effect of 15 U.S.C. § 16(a). See General Elec. Co. v. City of San
Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964). Accordingly, it is to the advantage of an antitrust
defendant who believes he will be convicted to have a consent judgment entered and thereby
avoid the judgment becoming prima facie evidence in a subsequent civil action.
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Notwithstanding the apparent roadblocks to the civil antitrust
litigant, the Justice Department may possess the most effective
method to obtain needed testimony. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6003,139
a United States attorney may request a grant of immunity to obtain
testimony if two conditions are met: first, that the information desired
is "necessary to the public interest" and second, that the individual
who possesses such information refuses to speak by asserting the fifth
amendment. 140 The Justice Department may request an immunity
grant when the privilege is asserted at a proceeding before or ancillary
to a court of the United States. 141 As a civil deposition in an antitrust
action is clearly ancillary to a federal court proceeding, a grant of
immunity may be provided if the Justice Department concludes that
the requested testimony is "necessary to the public interest."' 42
Testimony which is requisite to an antitrust plaintiff's cause of
action should meet the requirement of being "necessary to the public
interest,' 1 43 because the Supreme Court has placed great importance
on civil antitrust actions. 144 The Justice Department should adopt such
a view of the public interest in civil antitrust cases not only to aid the
plaintiff but also to preserve the integrity of the civil antitrust action
45
as the deterrent Congress intended it to be. 1
This proposal will necessitate the Justice Department's active
involvement in civil antitrust actions inasmuch as only the Department may make an immunity request. 46 Prior to making such a
request, the Justice Department should require the plaintiff to make a
showing of compelling need for such deposition testimony. 14 Failure
to show such need would result in the Department's refusal to request

'I See supra note 78.
140 Id. In Appeal of Conboy the plaintiff asked the Justice Department to request a grant of
immunity for Conboy at the civil depositions but it was refused. Pillsbury, 103 S. Ct. at 611 n.5.
141 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982).
142 Id.
1.3 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982).
141 See supra note 1.
145

Id.

18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982). Although pursuant to § 6003 the Justice Department must request
the district court to issue the grant of immunity, the function of the court is limited to determining if the statutory procedures have been complied with. See Thompson v. Garrison, 516 F.2d
986 (4th Cir. 1975).
117 In showing "compelling need" the plaintiff should be required to show that without the
testimony he will not be able to present his case and an injustice would be done. See United
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958) ("compelling need" standard applied in
requesting release of grand jury testimony). In the vast majority of civil antitrust cases the
plaintiffs do have a "compelling need" for the testimony. See Hartwell & Kenyon, supra note
130.
146
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immunity, a necessary check on abuse of this process. Should the
plaintiff meet this burden, the Justice Department could then determine if a continuing prosecutorial interest exists,1 48 and, if so, whether
this interest outweighs the plaintiff's need for testimony. As the balance should frequently be struck in the plaintiff's favor, conferring
immunity on civil antitrust deponents will be the tool necessary to
counter the stifling impact of Pillsbury.
Frances Panzini-Romeo

148 In most instances a prosecutorial interest does not remain. Justice Stevens pointed out in his
dissent that a prosecutor who requests a grant of immunity is aware that in most cases he
sacrifices the opportunity to prosecute the witness. Pillsbury, 103 S. Ct. at 630 (Stevens, J.
dissenting). The vast majority of immunized witnesses are not prosecuted for crimes revealed in
their immunized testimony. See Note, FederalWitness Immunity Problems and Practices Under
18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003, 14 AM. CruM. L. REv. 275, 282 (1976). Although the Immunity Unit of
the United States Department of Justice does not maintain statistics as to what the incidence of
subsequent prosecution based on immunized testimony is, "if any instances exist, they are rare."
Id. at 282 n.46 (quoting Letter from E. Ross Buckley, Attorney-in-Charge, Freedom of Information Privacy Unit, Criminal Division, Department of Justice to David J. Sugar (October 1, 1976)
(on file in the offices of the American Criminal Law Review, Washington, D.C.)).

